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ABSTRACT: The Insight addresses reverse discrimination in the field of free movement and derived 
residence rights for EU citizens’ family members who are third country nationals. It outlines the 
debate concerning the justification for differential treatment and discusses the role of the EU and 
the Member States in relation to reverse discrimination. While the Court of Justice has traditionally 
considered the exercise of the freedom of movement as a sufficient link with EU law, the recent 
case law shows that the coherence of this approach is under pressure. As the Lounes preliminary 
ruling shows (judgment of 14 November 2017, case C-165/16, Lounes [GC]), when movers settle in 
the host State, are fully integrated and eventually naturalize, differential treatments between mov-
ers and statics can be hardly justified and urge the Member States to address this phenomenon. 
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I. Brief introductory remarks: citizenship, national sovereignty 
and naturalization in the EU legal order 
According to settled principles of international law, it is up to States to decide who their 
nationals are.1 Hence, the acquisition and loss of citizenship have usually been considered 
building blocks of domestic sovereignty. In the past, this existential approach to nationali-
ty led to fictitious perceptions of an individual’s belonging to a State, centred on blood ties 
and adherence to the allegedly homogenous (ethnic, cultural, linguistic, etc.) features of a 
given community. Fictitious exclusivity resulted in oddities, such as diminished rights for 
 
* Assistant Professor of EU Law, University of Turin, stefano.montaldo@unito.it. 
1 The Court of Justice describes it as a principle of customary international law: Court of Justice, 
judgment of 20 February 2001, case C-192/99, Kaur, para. 20. 
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naturalized or dual citizens in comparison with “authentic” ones, or international conven-
tions aimed at discouraging the phenomenon of multiple nationalities. 
However, national authorities’ quest for control over the precise composition of 
their communities was soon confronted with overarching factors such as international 
migration flows, globalization and the rise of fundamental rights. These factors broke 
the chains of national exclusivity and the fiction was unveiled. As a result, the incidence 
of multiple nationalities and naturalization – as well as the importance of residence 
rights – rose sharply over the final decades of the twentieth century, leading to complex 
interactions between different legal systems around the world.2 
In the European Union, these interactions have been amplified by the objective of 
achieving an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe, particularly through free-
dom of movement and the establishment of EU citizenship. Key rights – such as uncon-
ditional access to the national territory or residence rights – that were previously con-
sidered as belonging to the Member States have either overcome their jurisdictions or 
been reproduced at the EU level. 
Still, this additional legal complexity reveals two potential and deeply intertwined 
flaws. On the one hand, reverse discrimination comes to the fore, with the exercise of 
rights stemming from EU law potentially becoming a source of differential treatment be-
tween Union citizens. In particular, those who have never taken advantage of their free-
dom of movement are in principle barred from certain rights stemming from EU law, such 
as derived residence rights for family members who are third-country nationals. 
On the other hand, the many possible evolutions of an individual’s situation can be 
an unexpected and powerful amplifier of reverse discrimination. The deepening of the 
European integration process has brought about increasing interactions among Mem-
ber State nationalities. Thanks to the opportunities offered by the internal market and 
the area of freedom, security and justice, EU citizens move and settle abroad with their 
families. An increase in multiple nationalities and naturalizations is an inherent out-
come of fully-fledged implementation of the freedom of movement of persons in an 
ever-closer and socially cohesive Union. In principle, this phenomenon represents a ma-
jor success for the European integration process. At the same time, it can be difficult to 
handle in an area where the scope of EU law is limited and a significant degree of frag-
mentation of national legal orders persists.3 
Walking the fine line between reverse discrimination, national sovereignty, advanc-
es towards successful EU citizen integration in host Member States and the eventual 
 
2 Interestingly, many States contribute to the rise of multiple nationalities. They often decide to ex-
pand the scope of their control by conferring nationality to the descendants of their nationals leaving the 
country. D. KOCHENOV, Double Nationality in the EU: An Argument for Tolerance, in European Law Journal, 
2011, p. 323 et seq. 
3 For instance, a static citizen could be a national of a Member State in which he has never lived, due 
to the nationality acquisition rules of the State in which he lives. 
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establishment of a true European community of people, the Court of Justice has tried to 
find a way to eliminate the flaws outlined above. Or, at least it has tried to mitigate the 
impact of reverse discrimination, despite being constrained by the limits of its jurisdic-
tion and of EU competences in general. Over the last decade, the Court of Justice has 
been at the forefront in empowering EU citizenship and free movement rights, as 
demonstrated by the case law involving derived residence rights for third-country na-
tionals related to a Union citizen.  
A recent preliminary ruling is particularly illustrative in this regard and further exac-
erbates the tensions between the expansion of the rights granted by EU (primary) law 
and national migration policy choices. In Lounes,4 the Court was confronted with the 
opportunity to acknowledge a derived residence right in favour of a third country na-
tional whose wife – an EU citizen – had been naturalized in the Member State in which 
she had resided for over 20 years. Along with its precedents, Lounes challenges the cur-
rent justifications to differential treatment between movers and static Union citizens, as 
well as the future feasibility and overall consistency of the approach followed by the 
Court of Justice thus far. It raises systemic questions regarding the consequences at-
tached by domestic legal orders to a failed or successful path of social integration in the 
host Member State, as well as how a Union citizen’s degree of integration impacts the 
enjoyment of the rights stemming from Union citizenship and free movement. 
In this context, this Insight firstly addresses the debate concerning reverse discrimina-
tion in the area of the free movement of persons (Section II). Secondly, it focuses on the 
current reach of the Court of Justice case law on the definition of purely internal situa-
tions, as a (temporary?) way of delimiting the impact of reverse discrimination (Section III). 
The following section applies these premises to the never-ending saga of the scope of free 
movement and EU citizenship rights and their interactions with national legal orders (Sec-
tion IV). The Lounes judgment is used as an example of how exceptional – but actually 
strategic and reasonably not uncommon in the European Union in the long run – factual 
circumstances can test the interaction between EU law and national legal orders and take 
the underlying tensions between the two poles to the extreme. The last Section briefly 
discusses the systemic implications of this case law, which affects the overall coherence of 
the Court’s sectoral approach to the delimitation of the scope of EU law and puts pressure 
on the current justification for reverse discrimination. 
 
4 Court of Justice, judgment of 14 November 2017, case C-165/16, Lounes [GC]. 
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II. The debate on reverse discrimination and freedom of movement 
Reverse discrimination has always been a contentious issue in the EU legal order.5 Pleas 
against it have been raised repeatedly alongside the gradual strengthening of the inter-
nal market and the rise of the four fundamental freedoms.  
Some scholars have pointed out that reverse discrimination conflicts with the land-
marks of the progress of the EU legal order, such as the abolition of controls at internal 
borders in the Schengen area6 or the establishment of EU citizenship.7 More generally, 
the structural paradigm shift of the Union integration process from primarily economic 
objectives to the “creation of a sense of identity” and the centrality of fundamental rights 
has been put forward to argue that reverse discrimination is outdated.8 From this point of 
view, a ground-breaking role is attached to the principle of equal treatment under Art. 18 
TFEU, which “further undermines the survival of reverse discrimination”.9  
This is understandably the essence of the criticism against situations where EU law 
basically requires Member States to treat EU citizens in a way they did not originally in-
tend to treat their own nationals. Accordingly, some authors contend that Union institu-
tions should bear the responsibility for addressing and resolving this asymmetry. In 
particular, from this perspective, the Court should promote a more extensive interpre-
tation of the Treaty provisions on EU citizenship, equal treatment and free movement of 
persons.10 Eliminating reverse discrimination would be an effective way of promoting a 
meaningful concept of EU citizenship as a status advancing individuals’ rights rather 
than separating Union citizens in differentiated regimes, since equal treatment en-
shrines a right conferred by EU law to all nationals of the Member States.11 
The existential connection between the Union integration process and non-
discrimination has been used to counter acceptance of reverse discrimination even within 
the Court of Justice. AG Mischo famously labelled reverse discrimination as unacceptable 
 
5 Discrimination is characterized as reverse when an unexpected group is treated less favourably 
than a group that is normally discriminated against: G. DAVIES, Nationality Discrimination in the EU Inter-
nal Market, Den Haag: Kluwer Law International, 2003, p. 19. For a comprehensive analysis see F. 
SPITALERI, Le discriminazioni alla rovescia nel diritto dell'Unione europea, Roma: Aracne, 2010. 
6 H. D’OLIVEIRA, Is Reverse Discrimination Still Permissible After the Single European Act?, in T.M. DE 
BOER (ed.), Forty Years on: The Evolution of Postwar Private International Law in Europe, Den Haag: 
Kluwer Law International, 1990, pp. 73-74. 
7 N.N. SHUHIBNE, Free Movement of Persons and the Wholly Internal Rule: Time to Move on?, in 
Common Market Law Review, 2002, p. 731 et seq. 
8 C. DATRICOURT, S. THOMAS, Reverse Discrimination and Free Movement of Persons Under Community 
Law: All for Ulysses, Nothing for Penelope?, in European Law Review, 2009, p. 454. 
9 S. O’LEARY, The Evolving Concept of Community Citizenship: From Free Movement of Persons to Un-
ion Citizenship, Den Haag: Kluwer Law International, 1996, pp. 276-277. 
10 A. TRYFONIDOU, Reverse Discrimination in EC Law, Den Haag: Kluwer Law International, 2009, pp. 61-64. 
11 E. SPAVENTA, Seeing the Wood Despite the Trees? On the Scope of Union Citizenship and its Consti-
tutional Effects, in Common Market Law Review, 2008, p. 44. 
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in the long run, because he believed that the principle of equal treatment should have 
been the guiding star for the development of the internal market all along.12 
Even so, the Court has consistently acknowledged that, in the event of a purely in-
ternal situation,13 EU law does not prevent a Member State from treating its nationals 
less favourably than Union citizens benefiting from the rights conferred by EU law. Two 
main arguments have been used to support this approach. Firstly, overcoming reverse 
discrimination would impact considerably the vertical division of competences between 
the EU and the Member States. Aside from any concern regarding its actual political 
feasibility, the expansion of the scope of rights stemming from EU law would require 
significant amendments to the Treaties and could hardly be achieved through an exten-
sive interpretation of existing clauses.14  
Secondly, unless a clear contrary political choice “to eliminate the inequality” is 
made by the Member States, reverse discrimination appears to be an inherent feature 
of the intersections in the multi-layered governance on which the Union is based.15 
More specifically, it can be considered a natural consequence of the co-existence, in the 
same territory, of norms belonging to different legal systems, often pursuing different 
objectives or grounded on a variety of values or political priorities.16 In line with this ap-
proach, the Court of Justice itself has repeatedly remarked that it is up to the national 
court to assess whether there is discrimination, and up to domestic authorities to de-
termine whether and how any given discrimination is to be eliminated.17 
Considering the structural nature of reverse discrimination, Lenaerts contended 
that it can be proscribed only insofar as such treatment is in plain contradiction with the 
objectives of EU law.18  
Therefore, the key concern is the criterion determining an accepted inequality. In 
this respect, as the Court of Justice made clear in its early case law,19 purely internal sit-
uations fall outside the scope of application of EU law and consequently allow room for 
coexisting differentiated regimes based on EU and national law respectively. The next 
Section examines this concept and its development within the framework of the free 
movement of persons. 
 
12 Opinion of AG Mischo delivered on 24 September 1986, joined cases 80/85 and 159/85, Edah. 
13 See Section III. 
14 N.N. SHUIBHNE, The Resilience of EU Market Citizenship, in Common Market Law Review, 2010, p. 1615. 
15 D. HANF, Reverse Discrimination in EU Law: Constitutional Aberration, Constitutional Necessity or 
Judicial Choice?, in Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 2011, p. 29 et seq. 
16 E. CANNIZZARO, Producing Reverse Discrimination Through the Exercise of EC Competences, in 
Yearbook of European Law, 1997, p. 29 et seq. 
17 Court of Justice, judgment of 16 June 1994, case C-132/93, Steen, para. 10. 
18 K. LENAERTS, L’égalité de traitement en droit communautaire, in Cahiers de droit européen, 1991, p. 41. 
19 The first reference to the concept of purely internal situations dates back to 1979: Court of Justice, 
judgment of 7 February 1979, case 115/78, Knoors, para. 24. 
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III. The exercise of the freedom of movement as a sufficient link with 
EU law 
The Court of Justice gave the first definition of a purely internal situation in Saunders, re-
ferring to the absence of “factors connecting [it] to any of the situations envisaged by [Un-
ion] law”.20 The Court then clarified that a sufficient link is enough to trigger the applica-
tion of EU law and further connected it to the presence of a cross-border element. In rela-
tion to Art. 45 TFEU, a prominent role is traditionally given to the exercise of the freedom 
of movement, based on both a textual and teleological interpretation of primary law.21  
Recourse to an internal market-oriented logic, which collides with the rationale un-
derpinning Union citizenship and with the rise of fundamental rights, has proven to be 
a contentious issue. In Flemish Care Insurance, AG Sharpston challenged the sustaina-
bility of the purely internal situation doctrine, considering that Art. 21 TFEU recognizes 
per se a right to move and reside anywhere in the territory of the Union to all EU citi-
zens, regardless of whether or not they are static.22 
Moreover, the Court’s attempt to provide a criterion defining the scope of applica-
tion of EU law has been challenged as an arbitrary distinction “begging the question of 
what degree of connection is required”.23 The fact that individual situations are often 
complex and difficult to interpret amplifies the risk of uncertainty and unpredictability, 
which are even worse than the problem the criterion is intended to solve.24  
Key questions are then raised, such as “what kind of movement should be exercised, 
when that exercise should have happened and for how long a cross-border element 
should exist”.25 The what, when and how of free movement have been the constant con-
cern of Court of Justice case law throughout the last two decades, aiming to address the 
quest for increased certainty and minimized inequality. Partially in line with this approach, 
 
20 Court of Justice, judgment of 28 March 1979, case 175/78, Saunders, para. 11.  
21 Court of Justice, judgment of 27 October 1982, joined cases 35/82 and 36/82, Morson and Jhanjan, 
paras 15-18. Admittedly, unlike the other relevant Treaty provisions, Art. 45 TFEU does not refer to actual 
cross-border movement, but the Court of Justice as always considered this element to be an implicit fea-
ture of this provision. 
22 Opinion of AG Sharpston delivered on 28 June 2007, case C-212/06, Government of the French Com-
munity and Walloon Government v. Flemish Government (Flemish Care Insurance), paras 121 and 140. On 
the contrary, the Court of Justice has always supported the need for a cross-border element, because of the 
wording of Art. 21 TFEU, which refers to the limits and conditions prescribed by primary law. Court of Justice, 
judgment of 5 June 1997, joined cases C-64/96 and C-65/06, Uecker and Jacquet, para. 23 et seq. 
23 D.M.W. PICKUP, Reverse Discrimination and Freedom of Movement of Workers, in Common Market 
Law Review, 1986, p. 154. 
24 A. TRYFONIDOU, Reverse Discrimination, cit., p. 218. Moreover, “lottery rather than logic would seem 
to be governing the exercise of EU citizenship rights”: Opinion of AG Sharpston delivered on 30 Septem-
ber 2010, case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano, para. 88. 
25 P. VAN ELSUWEGE, S. ADAM, The limits of Constitutional Dialogue for the Prevention of Reverse Dis-
crimination, in European Constitutional Law Review, 2009, p. 334. 
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AG Tesauro even tried to add a “why” to the list of questions outlined above, in order to 
avoid abusive reliance on EU law. In his opinion in Singh, he expressed the view that a di-
rect causal link between the exercise of the freedom of movement and the right relied on 
pursuant to EU law was to be ascertained as a pre-condition for determining whether a 
situation falls under the scope of application of EU law.26 
However, the Court of Justice did not uphold this approach and has been trying to 
bridge the gap between the abstract acknowledgement of the cross-border criterion 
and the many facets and traps of the actual exercise of the right to move. On the one 
hand, the Court of Justice has defined the general framework within which the notion of 
movement is placed. For instance, it has taken the stance that the actual connection 
with EU law cannot be represented by “a purely hypothetical prospect” of exercising the 
freedom of movement.27 On the other hand, it has resorted to the empowerment of EU 
citizenship as a means to limit the importance – or even the exclusivity – of the material 
element of the exercise of the freedom of movement. In a well-known series of cases,28 
which is still being refined and clarified,29 the Court of Justice acknowledged that Art. 20 
TFEU can be the basis for granting such a derived residence right as long as refusal 
would not preclude the “the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights con-
ferred by virtue of his[/her] status as a Union citizen” for the EU citizen involved. 
However, the protection afforded by Art. 20 TFEU is inherently limited to exception-
al situations, de facto embodied by the primary caregivers of minor EU citizens so far. 
Currently, the Court has conversely acknowledged that this provision does not prevent 
a Member State from denying a derived right of residence in its territory, as long as the 
EU citizen has never exercised the right to move and provided the core of the rights 
stemming from Union citizenship is not affected.30 Therefore, the presence of actual 
movement is still a predominant criterion upon which the scope of application of EU 
law is made conditional.31 
 
26 Opinion of AG Tesauro delivered on 20 May 1992, case C-370/90, Singh, para. 5. 
27 Court of Justice, judgment of 28 June 1984, case 180/83, Moser, para. 18; in relation to the derived 
rights of an EU citizen’s family member, Court of Justice, judgment of 8 November 2012, case C-40/11, 
Iida, para. 77. 
28 See, inter alia, Court of Justice: judgment of 8 March 2011, case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano [GC]; judg-
ment of 5 May 2011, case C-434/09, McCarthy; judgment of 15 November 2011, case C-256/11, Dereci [GC]. 
29 Court of Justice: judgment of 10 May 2017, case C-133/15, Chavez-Vilchez [GC]; judgment of 8 May 
2018, case C-82/16, K.A. and Others v. Belgium [GC]. 
30 Court of Justice, judgment of 8 May 2013, case C-87/12, Ymeraga, para. 45. 
31 Cf. C. MORVIDUCCI, I diritti dei cittadini “statici” nella giurisprudenza recente della Corte di giustizia, 
in A. DI STASI (ed.), Cittadinanza, cittadinanze e nuovi status: profili internazionalistici ed europei e sviluppo 
nazionali, Napoli: Editoriale Scientifica, 2018, pp. 258-262.  
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IV. From U-turners to naturalized citizens: the role of Art. 21, para. 
1, TFEU 
In this context, the persisting prominence of tangible movement derives from two fur-
ther factors. Firstly, Art. 3, para. 1, of Directive 2004/38/EC codifies the need for a trans-
boundary element. Pursuant to this provision, the Directive applies only to Union citi-
zens moving to or residing in a “Member State other than that of which they are a na-
tional”. Secondly, ever since the initial phases of the integration process, the Court of 
Justice has consistently held that a person cannot be treated less favourably because 
he/she left the Member State of origin.32 So, the Court considers that any measure ca-
pable of discouraging a person from exercising the freedom of movement is in principle 
incompatible with EU law. 
At the same time, building on this settled approach, the Court of Justice has been 
trying to expand the scope of the concept of a person’s movement. Eliminating obsta-
cles to movement is indeed the compelling ratio decidendi behind the Court’s stance on 
U-turners, whose situation falls outside the scope of the Directive. Returners, in fact. are 
those EU citizens who move back to their country of origin after enjoying the freedom 
to move and reside in another Member State, thereby failing to fulfil the criterion set 
forth in Art. 3, para. 1, of the Directive.  
In Singh and in Eind,33 the Court of Justice stated that the Treaty entitles the family 
member to a derived right of residence in the State of origin to which a worker returns 
after having settled abroad. Years later, in O. and B.,34 it made a step forward, acknowl-
edging that U-turners residing abroad on the basis of their sole status as Union citizens 
enjoy a right to return while maintaining family connections.35 The original exercise of the 
freedom to move understandably includes the decision to go back to one’s State of na-
tionality and consequently triggers the protection afforded by EU law, under Art. 21, par. 
1, TFEU. If this were not the case, EU citizens could be dissuaded from leaving their Mem-
ber State of origin, thereby hindering the full effectiveness of the freedom of movement.36 
So, in other words, returning to the State of nationality falls within the scope of EU law. 
 
32 Court of Justice, judgment of 7 February 1979, case 115/78, Knoors, para. 20. 
33 Court of Justice: judgment of 7 July 1992, case C-370/90, Singh; judgment of 11 December 2007, 
case C-291/05, Eind [GC]. 
34 Court of Justice, judgment of 12 March 2014, case C-456/12, O. and B. [GC]. 
35 Interestingly, on all these occasions, the Court specified that the right to return is contingent upon 
genuine residence in the host State, in line with the requirements laid down in Arts 7, paras 1 and 2, and 
16 of Directive 2004/38/EC. The Directive does not apply, but its provisions strike back by analogy. See O. 
and B. [GC], cit., paras 37-40. 
36 In the parallel case S. and G., the Court followed the same approach in relation to Art. 45 TFEU. 
The Court acknowledged a residence right for a family member of an EU worker who regularly moved to 
another Member State on a weekly basis for work, without having acquired formal residence there. Court 
of Justice, judgment of 12 March 2014, case C-457/12, S. and G. [GC]. 
Freedom of Movement, Social Integration and Naturalization: Testing Reverse Discrimination 9 
More recently, the Court’s approach has been challenged by an even more borderline 
situation. In Lounes, Ms. Ormazabal is a Spanish national who moved to the UK in 1996, 
settling there on a permanent basis. In 2009, she decided to naturalize as a British citizen, 
while retaining her Spanish nationality. In 2014, she married Mr. Lounes, an Algerian na-
tional residing illegally in the UK. Her husband soon applied for a residence card by virtue 
of being an EU citizen’s family member. However, his application was rejected, on the 
grounds that, due to naturalization and pursuant to national law, his wife could no longer 
be regarded as a beneficiary of the rights conferred by Directive 2004/38/EC.  
Basically, the Court of Justice was confronted with an apparent “internalization” of a 
cross-border situation created by a movement dating back over 20 years. Moreover, the 
exercise of this fundamental freedom eventually resulted in the mover being naturalized 
in the host Member State, i.e. the most considerable outcome of a successful process of 
social integration. Consequently, Directive 2004/38/EC could not be relied on and the 
United Kingdom sought to apply (undeniably more stringent) domestic immigration law. 
Against this backdrop, the Court of Justice considered that the situation was not 
purely domestic, confirmed that Ms. Ornazabal could not be considered a beneficiary 
for the purposes of Directive 2004/38/EC and took the stance that a derived right to res-
idence in favour of Mr. Lounes was to be drawn from Art. 21, para. 1, TFEU. Ms. Or-
nazabal’s movement from Spain to the UK – albeit far in the past – established a suffi-
cient link with EU law. 
Lounes confirms that, in principle, dual nationality does not preclude the applica-
tion of EU law. The Court had already held that a link with EU law exists when a national 
of a Member State habitually resides in another Member State of which he/she is also a 
national.37 
More generally, the solution offered by the Court is in line with its case-by-case at-
tempt to erode the purely internal situations doctrine, whenever any sort of link with EU 
law can be detected. In the present case, the Court of Justice achieves its aim by stretch-
ing the importance of the exercise of the freedom of movement to the extreme. While it 
is a means to expand the rights stemming from EU law, the Court’s reliance on a very 
feeble link with EU law fans the embers of the highly controversial justification of re-
verse discrimination against those EU citizens – the vast majority, actually – who decide 
not to leave their home country. 
V. Concluding remarks: how long does a mover need special 
protection? 
Differential treatments and their perception inherently evolve over time. Certain dis-
criminations may have gone previously unnoticed or tolerated because of objective and 
 
37 Court of Justice, judgment of 8 June 2017, case C-541/15, Freitag, para. 34.  
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compelling justifications,38 or due to the moral attitude underlying a legal order.39 
Therefore, differential treatments require careful reconsideration over time, along with 
the evolution of the scope and meaning of the general principles of a given community 
of law and the societal values they express. 
As discussed above, reverse discrimination in the European Union is the domestic 
by-product of not entirely converging – if not actually diverging – EU and national re-
gimes. As such, it is a systemic phenomenon deriving from the interaction between dif-
ferent regulatory levels. However, this does not mean it is irrefutable. The allocation of 
roles and responsibilities in dealing with this phenomenon – and, consequently, for the 
ongoing review of the acceptability of a certain differential treatment – is one of the 
core issues at the heart of the relationship between the EU and national legal orders. 
Member States are structurally disadvantaged, as they are expected to apply provi-
sions that are more favourable than their own regimes to certain categories of people (at 
least), within the realm of EU law. Crucially, this vertical and unilateral source of discrimi-
nations puts Member States at the forefront, as national authorities bear the primary 
burden of dealing with the implications of differential treatment within their territory. This 
is per se natural, as national institutions are best positioned to address reverse discrimi-
nation in the domestic political and legal arena. It is up to them to decide whether main-
taining differential treatment is a price worth paying and, if it is, how to generalize such 
EU-driven more favourable treatment. A look at some national legal orders reveals oppos-
ing systemic solutions. In Italy, for instance, Art. 53 of the Law no. 234 of 2012 provides for 
a general ban on reverse discrimination against Italian citizens.40 In France and Germany, 
on the other hand, differential treatments to the detriment of nationals are considered 
the result of the coexistence of national and EU laws. Therefore, they involve situations 
that are not comparable and do not affect the principle of equality.41 
At the same time, EU-driven advantageous treatment often involves sensitive issues 
on which the advances of EU law face more conservative positions at the domestic level. 
As the recent Coman preliminary ruling and the Romanian legal and political scenario 
demonstrate,42 a Member State may have difficulty accepting a more favourable EU re-
 
38 Opinion of AG Sharpston delivered on 22 May 2008, case C-427/06, Bartsch, paras 45-46. 
39 H.L.A. HART, The Concept of Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 163. 
40 Law no. 234 of 24 December 2012 (Italy), Norme generali sulla partecipazione dell’Italia alla forma-
zione e all’attuazione della normativa e delle politiche europee. 
41 For a discussion on selected legal orders, including the French and the German ones, see V. 
VERBIST, Reverse Discrimination in the European Union. A recurring Balancing Act, Cambridge: Intersentia, 
2017, p. 303 et seq. 
42 Court of Justice, judgment of 5 June 2018, case C-673/16, Coman [GC]. On the Romanian situation 
concerning the recognition of same-sex marriages see C. COJOCARIOU, Same-Sex Marriage Before the Court 
and Before the People: The Story of a Tumultuous Year for LGBT Rights in Romania, in Vervassungsblog, 
25 January 2017, verfassungsblog.de. A referendum was called in order to change the national constitu-
tion, by clarifying the will to limit the scope of the notion of family to heterosexual unions. The referen-
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gime per se and, consequently, may not be ready or willing to extend it beyond the sub-
jective scope of application of EU law. This calls for remedies at the EU level to prevent 
discrimination and, in any case, provide common solutions.  
As a first option, allocation of responsibility to the EU would entail legal harmoniza-
tion, which appears both unfeasible and undesirable. Not only would it require a seri-
ous reconsideration of the current competences of the Union, especially in the fields of 
citizenship and migration law, but it would move to the EU level several considerable 
powers currently reserved to the national legislature. 
As for the role of the Court of Justice, its supporters have basically contended that it 
has done its best with the limited interpretative tools it has had so far. What is more, its 
judgments share the common denominator of expanding the scope of the rights grant-
ed by EU law, in favour of their beneficiaries. However, as outlined above, there have 
been repeated pleas for an in-depth review of such an interpretative path in order to 
abandon the case-by-case approach and the uncertainty it generates.43 Reliance on the 
scope of application of EU law can be intrinsically unpredictable when combined with 
the multiple facets of an individual’s situation. 
Lounes is an instructive example in this regard. EU law grants favourable regimes to 
movers based on their special situation and these differential treatments are justified 
for as long as the difficulty of living in a State that is not their own exists. However, the 
Court considers that even a naturalized mover deserves special protection, precisely 
because his/her situation is different from that of a national of the (still?) host State who 
has never left home.44 Once a mover, always a mover, one might say.  
On its part, Art. 21, para. 1, TFEU covers both the dynamic dimension of the free-
dom of movement and the objective of stable settlement in the host Member State. 
These are complementary poles encompassing the traditional internal market logic and 
a more progressive idea of an ever-closer and inclusive union among the peoples of Eu-
rope. Nonetheless, once this permanent settlement occurs and is formalized through 
naturalization, one might expect national law to apply, because of both the logic under-
pinning the interaction between EU and national law and the choice made by the per-
son involved, who has decided to settle in a Member State and is then expected to 
abide by its societal values and laws. 
Lounes even overturns the Court’s stance on U-turners. In fact, that line of cases re-
fers to the maintenance of statuses and rights already established abroad. In Lounes, 
the Court of Justice states that Art. 21, para. 1, TFEU also covers family links created af-
ter naturalization in the host State. This raises key questions: namely, how long an EU 
 
dum was held on 6 and 7 October 2018, but failed to gain the needed support and to meet the minimum 
required quorum. 
43 See opinion of AG Sharpston, Ruiz Zambrano, cit., paras 125-130, where the AG proposes a differ-
ent and comprehensive reverse discrimination test.  
44 Lounes [GC], cit., para. 54. 
12 Stefano Montaldo 
citizen residing abroad requires protection, and how long more favourable treatment 
can be justified after naturalization. The answers to these questions involve three stra-
tegic challenges to the current state of the art of reverse discrimination in the EU.  
Firstly, the judgment under consideration threatens the coherence of the Court’s 
sectoral approach to the notions of movement and purely internal situations.45 The 
Court has opened the door to a new sub-category of movers that goes well beyond the 
compelling situations acknowledged thus far.  
Secondly, and consequently, Lounes amplifies the unpredictability of the scope of 
EU law, thereby affecting the rationale underpinning migrants’ special rights and the 
justification for differential treatment.  
In this way, thirdly, rather than minimizing the impact of reverse discrimination, the 
Court of Justice exacerbates it and calls into question the role of the Member States. In 
fact, it is frankly difficult to determine the actual difference between a family relation-
ship established by a static EU citizen and a link established by a former mover now 
permanently settled or even naturalized in the host State.  
Besides the specific factual circumstances, the Court’s approach in Lounes puts 
pressure on the current division of responsibilities in justifying reverse discrimination 
and addressing it, and may call for future alternative solutions at both the EU and na-
tional levels. 
 
45 As underlined by Cornasaru, national legislations and practices do not cover all possible situations, 
in particular in the area of citizenship and migration law, thereby leading to a “permanent judicialisation 
of the problem”. See D.M. CORNASARU, Once Again with Reverse Discrimination in the Case of Dual Citi-
zens: From McCharty to Lounes, in A. DI STASI (ed.), Cittadinanza, cittadinanze, cit., p. 344. 
